Private investigations reveal regime shift
A key reason for today’s economic resilience is that, while governments have accumulated large amounts of debt, the private sector is far less leveraged than in the past. In the US, for example, household debt has fallen from around 100% of income in 2009 to 71% today, according to the IMF. Total private sector debt has also declined, from 236% of GDP in 2008 to about 217%.
Over the past two decades, leverage has largely shifted from private sector balance sheets to those of governments, rather than reflecting an unchecked build‑up of debt across the economy.
This distinction matters. Healthier household and corporate balance sheets support consumer spending and business investment, providing a firmer foundation for corporate earnings. They have also fundamentally changed how shocks — such as geopolitical disruptions — are transmitted through the economy.
Historically, downturns were accompanied by sharp rises in the proportion of firms falling behind on bank loan repayments. In the US, this rose from around 2-3% in the early 2000s to more than 7% during the Global Financial Crisis, according to the US Federal Reserve. These surges in credit stress amplified recessions, forcing companies to de‑leverage aggressively and cut jobs, reinforcing weakness in demand.
By contrast, over the past decade these ‘delinquency rates’ have remained close to historical lows, with broadly around 1-1.5% of firms falling behind. This has persisted even through major shocks, including the Covid‑19 pandemic and the most aggressive interest‑rate hiking cycle in decades.
The result is a more resilient corporate sector in which the traditional feedback loop between credit stress and economic activity has weakened. Rising government debt reflects the increasing role of fiscal policy in absorbing shocks that would previously have led to private sector de‑leveraging. Economic cycles have not disappeared – they have evolved.
The implication is a fundamentally different macroeconomic regime: fewer acute, credit‑driven downturns but greater long‑term sensitivity to fiscal sustainability and policy constraints.
It remains unclear whether this shift is cyclical or structural. Early investment in artificial intelligence was largely funded from cash flow, but recent months suggest a growing reliance on debt financing. Corporate leverage remains modest for now but, if this trend continues, the traditional transmission mechanism from credit markets to the real economy may reassert itself.